Since the 1990s supposedly 'historic' fault lines separating coffee preferences and practices across the European continent have been broken down. The consumption of Italian-style espresso-based beverages outside the home is now widespread. Much of this is drunk in branded coffee-shop outlets, based on af ormat popularised in the United States. This article investigates these changes employing the culture of production perspective. It is structured in three parts. The first investigates the formation of quasi-national coffee-drinking styles in the at-home and away-from-home sectors with particular reference to Italy; the second analyses the transformation of outof-home coffee-drinking in the UK during the 1990s; and the third examines the spread of Italian-style coffee across the European continent.
Introduction
The lastt wo decades have witnessed sweeping changesi nc offee culture across Europe, both in terms of the coffee beverages consumed and the places in which consumption has taken place. Supposedly 'historic' fault lines separating regional beverage preferences and practices across the continent appear to be breaking down with the widespread adoption of Italian-style espresso-based beverages such as cappuccino,caffè latte and lattemacchiato. These coffee drinks are at the centre of the offerw ithin the 'speciality coffee shop' -a new service format that has spread into Europe from the UnitedStates -e pitomised by the Starbucks chain, which was operating in 20 European countries as of December 2011. 1 This article seeks to analyse why espresso coffee achieved prominence within European popular cultured uring the late twentieth century, focusing on the roleo f' producers' in effecting this transformation, and the extent to which it can be characterised as reflective of Americanisation, Europeanisation and/or Italophilia among coffee consumers.
Commentatorsh aves uggested thatc hanges in consumerd emandc ausedb yt he fundamental transformations in work andlifestylesexperienced overthe course of thedigital revolutionoffer one explanationfor thesuccess of thecoffee-shop format. The adventand diffusiono ft he personal, then portable, computer, them obilep hone and thes preado f wirelessconnectivityhaveall,inturn, contributed to thecreationofmoreautonomous ways of working. As well as enabling employeestoenjoy thefacilitiesofthe coffeeshopduring theworking day, theself-employedhaveincreasinglyadoptedthemasanalternativeoffice. A2012surveyof'cappuccinocommerce' suggested 22%ofsmall businessstart-ups in the UK hadbased themselves in coffeeshops to keep theiroverheads low.
Class position has often been portrayed as aconstraint upon access to thiscappuccino culture. Yet in 2013 the price of aregular cappuccino was recorded as being lower or equal to that for a5 00 ml glasso fl ocal draught beer in 20 of the 27 EU memberstates. 3 Both these beverages are used to charge for access to as ocial space; the difference is that the coffee shop, although equally accessible in economict erms, is perceived as culturally exclusive in away that the traditional drinkingestablishmentisnot. This is partly because the 'Italian-style' beverages are considered highlyp riced in comparison to an 'ordinary coffee',p articularly when prepared in the home. The questions become, therefore, how and why some social groups (not necessarily classes) were persuaded to pay this price to change their coffee preference, and why the 'speciality coffee shop' becamet he place where work and sociability intermingled.
To answer thesequestions, this article engages explicitly with the production of culture perspective developed by sociologist Richard A. Peterson,w hich analyses six facets of production -t echnology, law and regulation, industry structure,o rganisation structure, occupational careers,a nd producers' perceptions of the market -i nr elation to one another. 4 This model movest he focus of explanations for cultural change awayf rom autonomous shifts in consumer tastes that supposedly reflect aZeitgeist,orthe impact of such 'genius' innovations such as AchilleG aggia'se spresso machine, towards transformations withint he industries that supported the production and diffusion of new cultural outputs. Peterson's article 'Why 1955? Explaining the Advent of RockMusic',for example, highlights the importance of as hift by record producers from perceiving the market as homogeneoust oh eterogeneous, using the other facets of the perspective to analyse why this occurred in the mid-1950s. 5 An approach that shares Peterson's focus on producers of expressive symbols was applied to coffee culture by anthropologist William Roseberry. He analysed the waysi n which 'coffeemen' in the US sought to convince customers of the superior qualitieso f their specialty products to those of the food conglomerates.I nstead of thinking of the coffee market as as ingle masse ntity, roasters began to practise segmentation: crafting new blends to fit the desires of particulartypes of customers. 'Ethical' coffees (e.g. fairly traded),' flavoured' coffees (e.g. vanilla coffee) and 'origin' coffees (e.g. Guatemalan) were all developed to appealtod ifferent segmentsofthe market,enablingconsumersto exercisec hoice and discrimination by purchasing coffee that expressed their personal values and tastes. This appealed particularly to younger generations in search of goods that demonstrated whatP ierre Bourdieu has called' cultural capital' -h ence Roseberry's article is entitled 'The Rise of Yuppie Coffees and the Reimagination of Class'. 6 Thesources and methodology adopted in the following article reflect the contemporary nature and producer focus of the approach. Like Roseberry, Ihave madeconsiderable use of the trade press, 'peering over the shoulder'ofthe 'community of coffeemen' in order to eavesdrop on them talking to themselves, rather than to the consumer public. 7 Unlikehim, Ih ave takent his further by attending trade presentations and industryc onferences, and consulting market-research data that is notf reely available within the public domain. 8 Ih avea lsou tilisedo ral-history interviews,a longsidei nformal( but noted) conversations and email exchanges. Following Christopher Breward in his worko n fashion, Is ee thesea sw ays of connecting what, adapting Goffman, might be called the 'back stage' view of the coffee industry, to the 'front end' performativea spects of producing coffee culture. 9 All such evidence needs to be treated as text produced with its own particular biases and objectives,and preferably triangulated (although in the absence of archives, such corroboration mustoften be obtainedfrom similar sources). Nonetheless it yields information that would not be discussed in public forums, including the trade J. Morris 
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press, such as accounts of failure, and non-attributable actions. For example, Iasked one informant why he thought his coffee product had achieved such resonance with consumers as to be includedi napublication listing of Britain's iconic brands. 'That's simple Jonathan,'h er eplied, 'we bought it' -t hereby transformingt he evidence that Iw as preparing to analyse as ar eflection of consumer preference, into am anifestation of producer tactics.
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This article will contend that the samef acets of production that were identified by Peterson can help explain the waysi nw hich popular tastes and practices surrounding coffee-drinking have evolved withinE urope. It is structuredi nt hree parts. The first discussesw hatw em eanb yc offee, and investigates whena nd why coffee-drinking preferences began to diverge across the continent. It distinguishes betweent he at-home and away-from-home sectors, paying particular attention to the Italian case.T he second examines how the UK, traditionally atea-drinking culture, came to embracecoffee shops so rapidly in the 1990s. The third extends this analysis to the spread of espresso across the European continent, highlighting both similarities and differences of experience. Ad riving question for the article concerns the particulart iming of the 'Espresso Revolution': why has this apparent convergence of European tastes aroundI talian-style coffee only occurred over half ac entury after Achille Gaggia created modern-style espresso?
The production of 'national'beverages styles until the late twentieth century
The 'at-home' market Coffeeisnever 'just coffee'.The beans used within ablendcan comefrom many different origins,each with their own organoleptic qualities, which will in turn differ according to the way that they have been roasted. Thebeverage may be prepared using awidevariety of apparatus; it can be brewed to very different strengths and served in awide range of sizes; it can be taken with or without additives such as milk and sugar. Even the nature of the cup from which it is drunk can transmit important messages, turning coffee into an expressive symbol. An individual's coffee choice is, as Bourdieu would have it, indicative not merely of their economic, but alsotheir cultural, capital.
And yet coffee is frequently understoodas'just coffee'. Order a'coffee'inItaly and you will receive an espresso, in Switzerland ac afé crè me, in Norway ad emi-tasse of strong filter coffee and in the UK (until recently) am ug of 'instant' i.e. soluble, coffee. In this way coffee can also be presented as embodying as hared set of collective tastes, converting it into ab anal symbol of group identity, while reducing the individual expressive valueoft he beverage.
Throughout eighteenth-century Europe coffee was usually prepared by boilingt he ground beans directly with water in asingle pot: amethod derived from the practices of the Ottomansw ho had introduced the beverage to the continent. During the nineteenth century, the 'drip' method of preparation, first developed in France, becamed ominant. The ground coffee was placed in some form of container situated between two chambers of apot, with heated water added to the top chamber then percolating or 'dripping' down through the coffee into the bottom serving receptacle.
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At the end of the nineteenth century, coffee began to shift from being acolonialgood to an industrial product. Coffee-roasting equipment started to be manufactured by firms such as that established in 1868 by van Guelpen, Lensing &von Gimborn -t odayknown as Probat -i nthe Rhineland.This enabled specialist coffee-roasting enterprises to be set up, supplying ready-roasted beans to surrounding grocery stores. 12 The combination of the 3 883 EuropeanR eview of History-Revue europé enne d'histoire perishability and logisticsofdelivery meant roasters largelyoperated on alocal level, with the beans being sold loose and unbranded. Those branded coffee products that did develop were surrogates based upon chicory, such as the Camp Coffee produced by Paterson of Glasgow.
It was not until the twentieth century that domestic methods of coffee preparation began to diversify to the point that they started mapping onto regional boundaries. In 1908, the German housewife Melitta Bentz patented the paper filtration system that bore her name, enablinga'cleaner' tasting cup of coffee to be produced, as well as making it easier to clear up afterwards. In 1933 the Italian Bialetti company began producing the 'moka' -astovetop percolator that harnessedsteam pressure to brew amore concentrated beverage resembling that served in bars. In the late 1930s the French company Melior started manufacturing cafetiè res -t he originalplunge-pot or 'French press' coffeemaker, which allowed the groundst os teep in the water before being separated, producing an earthier tasting beverage. In 1938, in Switzerland, Nestlé launched their soluble coffee product knownasN escafé . 13 Widespread adoption of thesei nnovations only occurred during the post-war boom years of the late 1950sand 1960s, when coffee became areadily accessible mass consumer producti nW estern Europe.L arge scalec offee-roasters developed, taking advantage of technological developments in packaging and preservation to distribute branded roastand ground coffee through such new distribution channels as supermarkets, supported by advertising campaigns in new mediums such as radio and television. This resulted in significant concentration in both sectors:t he number of coffee roasters in the Federal Republic of Germany fell from around2000 in 1950 to 600 in 1960, while of the 300 or so coffee retail shops in Hamburgi n1 960, only 10 or so exist today. 14 Af ew keyroasters established their dominance within each nationalmarket, such as Lavazzai nI taly, Jacobs, Eduscho and Tschibo in Germany, DouweE gberts in the Netherlands, and Gevalia in Sweden. Nestlé took command of the Swiss market where soluble blends accountedfor over half of all coffee sold by the 1960s. 15 These two trends -t he concentration of the 'at-home' sector into the hands of afew larger roasters, and the diversificationo fp reparation styles across the continent -w ere closelyc onnected. Roasters couldp romotet heir coffee as best suited to the prevailing preparation method, helping to builda'banal nationalism' aroundc offee amongst consumer that could protect their market sharef rom external competitors. Their claims were not without foundation. Each preparation style requiresadifferent grind, while markets becameused to different blends and roast styles ranging from the lighter roasted Arabica bean blends prevalent in Germany and the Nordic countries through to the dark roasted robusta-basedblends found in countries such as France and Italy. Such distinctions are often presented as having been historically determined: for example, the Dutch taste for dark roasted, full-bodied coffees is attributed to the colonialr elationship with Java whose coffees were best prepared in that style, even though Indonesiacurrently supplies only 1.5% of the Netherlands' coffee imports. 16 While national marketsa re characterised by high levels of concentration, at the European levelt he three leading multinationals -N estlé ,K raft and Sara Lee -c ontrol less than 31% of the market, and have only achieved this by purchasing established 'national champion' brands. In the case of the US giants, Kraft owns Gevalia and Jacobs, purchased in 1970 and 1990 respectively; Sara Lee bought DouweEgberts in 1978. 17 From ap roduction of culturep erspective, then, it seems that the structureso ft he coffee trade combinedw ith technological innovation in both industrial equipment and domestic apparatus producea nd perpetuate distinctive 'national' coffee cultures.
J. Morris 4 884
The 'away-from-home' sector and the evolution of espresso Coffeep references in and out of the home can differ significantly,h owever.W ithin the domestic setting, consumer choices may be motivated by considerations concerning ease of preparation, the time involved,and the waste generated, whereas customer expectations outside the home may centre on the nature and speed of the service,and the perception that the beverage justifies the price paid for it.
Thecoffee industrydistinguishes between thesetwo sectors,which are structured very differently. Leading players in one arena may have only as mall presence in the other. In the 'away-from-home' or HORECA (Hotel, Restaurant and Catering) market, levels of concentration have usually remained lower,b oth amongst operatorst hemselvesa nd the coffee roasters who supply them. Industry structuresa lso vary significantly from one region to another, as do the spacesand cultures of coffee consumption out of home.
Italy, where espresso originated, demonstrates the importanceo ft he distinction betweent he at-home and away-from-home segments. With the growth of so-called American bars featuring over-the-counters ervice in the latter part of the nineteenth century, operators were keen to reducet he time takent od eliver coffee to customers. An umber of machine manufacturers, notably La Pavonia nd Victoria Arduino, started using steam to brew the coffee under pressure,t hereby speeding up the extraction rate. Their 'instantaneous'coffee machines produced whatthey called an espresso: afresh cup of coffee for an individual customer upon demand. Installed in elitee stablishments, the machines createdasense of theatrea roundc offee delivery, but the results often tasted burnt due to direct contact with the steam.
To combat this problem Achille Gaggia started producing machines capable of brewing coffee under high pressuresbyusing amanually operatedpiston system in 1948. Other manufacturers improved upon Gaggia's innovation, producing relatively cheap, electrically powered machines capable of continuously deliverings hots of coffee extracted under aroundn ine bars of pressure.T he resultant beverage was dubbed crema caffè (cream coffee) due to the appearanceofamousse of essential oils upon its surface. The new name was intendedt oe mphasise the distinctiveness of the beverage. 18 Italy's post-war 'economic miracle'w itnessed aw ave of immigration into the cities from the countryside. The numbers of neighbourhood bars serving ac ombination of coffee, snacks and alcoholic refreshment rose dramatically from 84,250 in 1956 to 118,029 in 1971. 19 These bars offered patrons aspace for socialisation, whether this was as part of ashort coffee break during the courseofthe workingday, adigestive coffee taken after the main meal (still usually lunche aten at home), or rest and relaxation during the evening -p rincipally the after-work aperitif. 20 Thep rice of coffee within the bar was controlled by legislation dating back to 1911 that allowed town councils to impose maximum prices for certain basic articleso f consumption. 21 The level was set following consultation with the local commercial associations whose role was strengthenedduringthe inter-war Fascist corporative regime when membership becameq uasi-compulsory. Their opinions were also sought in other matters of regulation, notably applications to open new premises, and collective controls over the hours and days that they traded. During the post-war republic the associations retained the right to be consulted and in practice probably exercised moreinfluence as they were no longerrequiredt oo perate under Fascist Partydiscipline. 22 This regulation effectively underpinned the creation of the Italian espresso bar format in that the control applied to coffee provided with minimal service to be drunk standingat acounter: the practice that became standard. By collectively agreeing to forgo margin, the small operators who dominated the bar sector, mostly employing low-cost, elastic, family 5 885 EuropeanR eview of History-Revue europé enne d'histoire labour, were able to make the sector unattractive to externale ntrantsw ho might have introduced new tradingf ormats that constituted at hreat to the sector as aw hole. No coffee-bar chains developed in Italy in the twentieth century therefore because the structureso ft he industry made it unattractive to do so. It madem ores ense for roasters active in the away-from-home sector to service their clients than to enterintocompetition with them, particularly when the margins in the sector were so small.
Althoughc onsiderable consolidationh as taken place in the at-home sector, where Lavazzahas maintainedamarket share of over 40% since the1990s, the largest share by volume in the 'away-from-home'isthatofIlly, whichwas estimatedatjust6%in2008. 23 Despite an absolutedeclineinthe number of roastersduring the 1950s and 1960s, the overall figureremains high, and is oncemore risingwitharound 900 recorded in the 2001 census. 24 This tenacity is primarily the consequence of the close ties that roasters establish with their clients by furnishing them with alarge number of services in return for the granting of an exclusive contracttosupply coffee. The roaster 'binds the bar ownertohim hand and foot' by providing machines 'free on loan', service support, staff training, branded items such as cups, and even financial assistance with loansf or furnishings. 25 The prize is an exclusive, locked-in, supplycontract that usually lasts for four to five years on terms that price the coffee at far morethan it is worth in the open market;however,the risk to roasters are also high in that bars are prone to financial difficulties, with start-ups having al ife expectancy of aroundtwo and ahalf years. 26 Despite the evolution of espresso as adistinctive beverage in Italy, the development of the structuress upporting the Italian coffee-bar industry mitigated against the pursuit of concentration and innovation, combining low prices, low margins and low service, all of which were reflectedback intoaformat that developed relatively low appreciation by the consumer for the producti tself. According to Giacamo Biviano, commercial director of Illy, 'in the end coffee has become like petrol,the consumer goes to any old bar,' paying little regard to what brand of coffee is served there. 27 Illy tries to counter this, promising operatorsthat its brand image, based upon the high quality of its blend, will increase their customer volume; but this requires bar owners to makealeap of faith as they pay more for their coffee supply per kilo, and are therefore forced to accept al ower margin per cup, because of the capped price.
Espresso machines were adopted in someofthe HORECA markets surrounding Italy, notably the 'Latin' countries of France, Spain and Portugal, as well as Austria and Switzerland during the 1950s and 1960s, all of which experienced arise in café sand snack bars serving an expanding urban working-class population. As in Italy, theses ectors remained highly fragmented, dominated by low-margin, low-service operations. The machines wereu sed primarily for their ability to producec offee beverages faster, rather than to develop adistinctive espresso offer. In Switzerland, for example, the mostpopular beverage was café crè me, acup (as opposedtoshot)ofblack coffee topped by ahead of crema, obtainedbybrewing under pressure using acoarser grind. Manufacturers such as Schä rf in Austria and Egro in Switzerland started producing automatic coffee machines for use in these localmarkets. 28 Northofthe Alps,drip coffeeremainedthe standardbeverage outsidethe home. Caterers utilisedb ulk-brewing apparatus sucha sc offee urns, and the continuous pour-over jug restingonahot plate. 29 Apartfromabrief flurry of interestincoffee barsasayouth-focused formatinthe 1950s, whichsubsided once it became clearthe beverages couldnot generate sufficient margin, espresso coffeer emained an essentially ethnic, exotic formo ft he beverage on the marginsofconsumption,confined to those eateries operatedbythe Italian é migré community whereitserved as amarkerofthe 'authenticity'ofthe business. 30 
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Theprecursortothe advent of the coffee chains in the United States was the emergence of the specialty coffee movement of small independentroasters and the 'gourmet' stores they supplied in response to concentration within the industry. Initially this focused on the sale of whole beans for home preparation. To encourage customers into the store, however, they increasingly started serving beverages on the premises as well. Starbucks, for instance, began in 1971 as aroaster/retailer in Seattle, but was transformed into acoffeeshop chain followingits purchase by Howard Schultz in 1987. 31 Thecoffee-shop format is predicated on the 'quick service' sale of coffee beverages as the principal source of revenue, making it acceptable for customers to order abeverage on its own. As well as providing at akeaway service, the coffee shop offers ac omfortable seatingarea in which customers can dwell after they have finished their drink.The 'rent' for usingthis space and its associated facilities(such as washrooms, newspapers, internet access) is wrapped into the price of the coffee beverage, meaningitneeds to incorporate a high mark-up, yet still appear to represent good value for moneytot he consumer. 32 Espresso coffee drinksw ere well suited to thisr ole, although while pure espresso is prevalent within the Italian coffee bar, it was cappuccino and caffè lattethat proved most popular in the coffee shops. These were presented as individually prepared items that were handcrafted by the barista, foaming the milk in fronto ft he customer. Milk-based beverages also met Americanc onsumer preferences for as weeter taste and could be adjustedtoindividual preferences by increasing their size, or offering them with additional flavourings or toppings, to create such concoctions such as the 'caramel latte'. 33 Thecombination of an Italian-style coffee with an American customer format allowed the coffee shop to supportthe construction of avarietyofcultural references aroundit. The potential for interplay betweent hese was particularly powerful within Europe where coffee shops began appearing in the mid-1990s.
The take-off of the coffee shop in the UK The breakthrough of the coffee-shop format was mostpronounced in the United Kingdom where averitable beverage revolution took placedriven by the growth of branded coffee outlets. As early as 2001 coffee was beingreportedashaving usurped tea as the leading hot beverage consumed outside the home, while in 2003 caffè latte replaced Newcastle Brown Ale in the basket of goods used to calculatethe consumer price index. Thesymbolism of this ousting of one of the most popular styles of beer,c loselyl inked to the declining workingclass in the North, by abeverage associated with the expanding Southern middle classes,was not lost among commentators. 34 This section investigates the reasons behind the rapid take-offofcoffee shops in the mid-1990s, and why espresso-based drinks have become the mainstream 'away-from-home' coffee offer in the new millennium.
Why 1995?
On 5N ovember 1994, ay oung woman named Sahar Hashemi reportedo nh er day researching the coffee options in the immediate vicinity of underground stations in London:
. You leave the tube station on your way to the office.Being the London we know and love,i t's ac old, grey morning. As their business plan explained, this would allow their outlet to price 'its coffee and other products competitively with the prevailingh igh-end coffee prices reflecting the high quality of the coffee and its high levelofcustomer service', moving towards the US model where 'people do notmind paying apremium for having the prestige factor of buyingtheir coffee from as pecialty store.' 37 On 5November 1995 they opened the first outlet of their CoffeeRepublic chain among the fashion stores and offices on South Molton Street. Shortly beforehand as imilar enterprise, the Seattle CoffeeCompany, had set up shop in Covent Garden. The growth in the branded speciality coffee-bar sector was dramatic: including units operating in transportt erminals, the overall number of outlets in the UK expanded by 846.5% in the period from 1993 to 1997. All of this growth was prior to the eventual entry of Starbucks, which opened its first storeonthe Kings RoadinSeptember 1998,having purchased the Seattle CoffeeCompany which by then had grown to 65 outlets. 38 Anyone who worked in London in 1994, or for the 30 years prior to that, would instantlyrecognise Hashemi's description of the sandwich bar. She estimated there were some 3000 in operation, many still run by the Anglo-Italian community which had been prominent among the UK catering sector for over ac entury. 39 These were no-frills operations, focused on food, whose low service values enabled them to deliver this at a cheap price. As even the defendersoft he working-men'scafé srecognised:
Their interior aesthetic has become DIY, aseries of stuck on posters, special offers, dishes of the day and taped-up, failing components and Formica surfaces [ ... ]. The menus are always the same and resolutely working class; this is the gastronomy of the council estate and the manual worker. 40 
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Yet elsewhere aso-called British food renaissance was in full swing as restaurants, foodservice operators and supermarkets all offered new gastronomic experiences to the beneficiaries of the economicboom of the mid-1980s -p rincipally private-sector workers in the South. Italian food and coffee wereb oth heavily employedw ithin these propositions, preparing the way for abranded beverage experience built upon the symbolic value acquiredb yItalian-style coffee.
Italian cuisine acquired greater cultural cachetw itht he opening of the high-end restaurant,t he River Café in 1987, co-foundedb yR uth Rogers (wife of the worldrenowneda rchitect Richard) in premises shared with her husband's practice. Serving seasonal and regional dishes, it marked anotable departurefrom the trattoria-style outlets that characterised the typical Italian restaurant within the capital. Many upmarket restaurantsstarted serving espresso, as opposedtodripcoffee, ensuring the machinewas prominently displayed to provide visual reinforcement of their 'serious' nature. 41 The leading aspirational supermarket at that time, Sainsbury's, added as ingle-estatee xtravirgin Italian oliveoil to its range in 1991, vintage balsamic vinegar in 1992 and in 1993 introduced 'Italian-style sandwiches [ ... ]inresponse to the recent popularity of speciality breads and the wide appeal of Italian food'. 42 Even its sachets of 'instant cappuccino' launched in 1991 were presented as providing access to sophisticated continental coffee. 43 Branded upmarkets andwich-chain formats were established, such as Pret aM anger, foundedin1986, and Aroma in 1991, which includedamore extensive coffee offer. Small café chains such as Café Rouge foundedin1989 placed more emphasis on coffee and allday service. 44 TheA nglo-Italian café sa nd sandwich bars started to install genuine espresso machines. One proprietor recountedh ow he bought aG aggia machinei n1 987, switched from milky coffees to cappuccinosand substituted brown rolls filled with corned beef with ones made from panini and roast peppers. 45 Thecoffee suppliertomanyofthese outlets, Costa Coffee -aroastery established in South London by two Italian brothersi n1 976 -s tarted opening so-called coffee boutiques. These were stands serving espresso-based drinks, locatedw ithin major transportt ermini from the late 1980s.
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Operators took care to explain to any customers orderinga ne spresso that 'what you have requested is "a small, very strong black coffee."' 47 Costa had opened 41 boutiques by the time it was acquiredb yW hitbread, a large brewery, hotel and leisureg roup in 1995, who saw it as vehicle to reproduce the success of the coffee houses already flourishing in the US.
Theestablished coffee and catering industry within the UK was mostly notable for its absence during the early years of the espresso explosion, however. In manyw ayst his is explicable by the structure of the overall coffee market.The growth in coffee consumption at home in the post-war era was almost entirely driven by 'instant' coffee brands manufactured by foreign multinationals, principally Maxwell House and Nescafé -w hile within the HORECA sector most roasters concentrated on private-label workfor suppliers who focused on supporting, rather than operating, service outlets. 48 Consequently, there were few 'coffeemen' involved in the take-off of the coffee shop in Britain-asignificant contrastf rom the growth of 'speciality' coffee within the US. More typical for the new entrepreneurswas AllanMcCallum-Toppin of AMT coffee -a partnership of three brothers from Seattle who, noting the lack of coffee shops in Oxford where they were studying,o pened ac offee cart in the shopping centre in 1993, and an outlet at the station in 1994. At that time, he recalled: 'None of us had had any barista training, in fact Idon't think it existed in thiscountry, it wasn't in the dictionary.' 49 Instead two changesi ne xternalr egulation came together to create not just the customers for the coffee shops, but their proprietorsa nd staff. Thefi rst was the de-9 889 EuropeanR eview of History-Revue europé enne d'histoire regulationo ft he London capitalm arkets, symbolised by the 'Big Bang' of 1986, which createdamore cosmopolitan city as institutions circulated staff betweendifferent financial centres,p rincipally Londona nd New York. Many were high-net-worthi ndividuals who were familiar not only with US-style coffee-house operations, but also knew how to raise funds.Scott Svenson, who, with hiswife Ally, foundedthe Seattle CoffeeCompany, had originally cometowork in the UK for the investment bank Drexel, while Bobby Hashemi of CoffeeR epublic had worked for Lehman Brothers in New York.
In 1997 Gerry Ford, aC alifornian venture capitalist operating in Europe,r aised sufficient funds to buy the five coffee bars tradingunder the name Caffè Nero. He asked Paul Ettinger with whom he had studied at the international business school INSEAD to join him on the board as food and beverage director, because he remembered his passion for food. Ettinger recalls:
Gerry knew alot about the food industry [ ...]but he'd never run afood business and Iknew nothing at all, I'd never had any formal training at all, and Ben the Finance Director, he'd been working for Dixon's and the Fraud Office, so we were really aclean sheet of paper. 50 This madet hem heavily reliant on their operations director Antonio Motisi, who they retained from the previous ownership ('Antonio[... ]actually knew how to run acoffee bar [ ... ]; he was our experience if we're really honest'), but it was their combined financial and commercial acumen that enabled them to turnC affè Nero into the third largest coffee-shop chain in the UK, aposition they consolidated by taking the company public in 2001, and purchasing Aroma in 2002,aswell as anumber of prime sites from the by-now flagging Coffee Republic.
Thes econd key regulationw as the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1993, which enshrinedthe right of intra-EU migrants to live and work in othermembers tates, thereby facilitating the flows of youngp eople who financedt heir travel by working as baristas. Ettinger estimates that 97%ofthe staff in the London operations of Caffè Nero were non-British, recallingthat:
Therew erew aves of immigrantsc omingt hroughL ondon, at onet ime Italians,t hent here wereS wedish [presumably after that country'sa ccession to theE Ui n1 995; JM][... ]. Youngpeople, typically between school anduniversity,orjustleftuniversity,wetrain them forthree weeks, they might ideally last forsix months,d oagreatjob,[... ]and then they move on. 51 The nationality of the baristas often fed into the identity of the coffee-shop brand. Coffee Republic recruited baristas from American students workinga broado nt he BUNAC scheme. 52 The Costa brothers had operated their coffee boutiquesa sq uasi-franchises to families they knew from the Italian community, who Marco Costa recalled coming round to his parents' house to deliver the takings on aSunday evening. 53 Even after the change of ownership, Costa's communications materials reiterated their claims to be 'Italiana bout Coffee', continuing to tell storiesabout the Costa brothersdespite their having retired to Monaco, beforeswitching to their suitably Italian roastery manager Gino Amasanti.
Caffè Nero too invested in its Italian branding, turning an early review by Tatler magazine proclaiming it served 'thebest espresso this side of Milan' into its tagline. The strategy extended to its coffee operations:
It was ablend that was an actual Italian espresso blend with asmall amount of robusta and that sets us apart from nearly all of our competition, it was roasted by alittle old Italian guy in a garage in Bermondsey [ ...].
[P]eople knew if they came to Nero it was all going be around espresso [ ...]wenever did any drip coffee.
[W]e never tried to be smart, we didn't do the big American jugs, at that time we didn't really do iced drinks or hardly, we didn't do the gimmicks, the syrups, so we were early on very pure [ ...]anItalian coffee bar. 54 This policy even extended to smoking:
We were asmoking hangout from day one [ ...]which was part of our culture and our Italian heritage.
[I]t seems incredible but at the time it was part of our brand. 55 All of this was intendedt od ifferentiate the two imitationI talian brands from Starbucks, whose entryinto the market led to afierce competition for sites with the greatest footfall on the one hand, but provided the momentum for exponential growth in the overall sector on the other. Brand loyalty was unlikely to see customers deviate more than ac ouple of streets from their regular routes to the train station or the office. Operators attempted to extend their coverage by openingasmany units as possible; locating next to competitors in ahigh-footfall area was lessrisky than conceding potential customers. Often they simply sought to oust the old-style sandwich bars and café swhoselow-service format could not generatethe samerevenues from as ite. According to one coffee supplier:
At the beginning Il ost customers when Starbucks said here's twenty grand more than your shop is worth, now get out; and they thought we'd have to sell al ot more coffee to make twenty grand so they took the money. 56 The overall number of coffee shops in the UK (including independents) rose from 4756 in December 1997 to 6917 in 2001, acompoundannual growth rate of 9.82%.Within this, the number of branded units rose from 371in1997 to 1784 in 2001 -aremarkable annual compound rate of 48.1% p.a. By 2005 the branded chains constituted 30% of the coffeeshop sector, up from 8% in 1997, while the independents' share had fallen from 82% to 56%. Coffees hops began to take off outside the capital with the proportion of branded outlets locatedint he regions rising from 51% in 1999 to 65%i n2 005. 57 
Moving mainstream
Aconsequence of the success of the branded chains was that the perception of Italian-style coffee representing premium value became well established. Other retail and service operatorsstarted introducing similar coffee offers within their enterprises to exploit this. As Table 1s hows, the fastestgrowing area within the coffee-shop sector since 2005 has been among such non-specialist operators as department stores, supermarkets, servicestation operators and the like. That growth was facilitated by technology-notably the development of so-called super-automatic 'bean-to-cup' machines that simultaneously incorporate all the preparation stages performed by the barista in the coffee shop, to producebeverages at the touchoft he button.
As econds timulus againc ame from regulation. The introduction of no-smoking legislation in 2007 had little direct impact upon the branded coffee chains who, with the exception of Nero, had not allowed it in the first place. Pub chains, however, were fearful 11 891 EuropeanR eview of History-Revue europé enne d'histoire of losing asignificant amountofrevenue as aresult of the ban, possiblyupto20%. Many therefore invested in apremium, i.e. Italian-style coffee offer, in order to develop another revenue stream in which the profit marginismuch higherthan on beer. 58 The pub chain JD Wetherspoon entered intoa na greement with Lavazza, the Italian coffee roaster, and promoted its coffee heavily on the back of the credibilityconveyed by the Italian brand. This was delivered through ac ombination of bean-to-cup and single-portion capsule machines, reducing the training needs for staff.
Other pub operatorsc onstructed similar alliances, replacing their low-priced, lowvalue coffee offers that complemented the core food and drink business with new ones that could drive profitability. Exploiting the newly liberalised licensing legislation of 2003 (promoted as facilitating the growth of a'continental café culture'),they started opening throughout the day to attract customers to sample this. 59 Thespread of Italian-style coffee into petrol-service stations was pioneeredinthe UK by CoffeeN ation, which originally installed instant-coffee vending machines but found that they did not encounter great success. According to the founderMartin Dawes:
As soon as Ir eplaced my original instant coffee machines with ag ourmet espresso-based machine, added Coffee Nation-branded cups and then put the price up, the sales leapt up and I then knew Ihad av iable business model. 60 In 2000 Dawes raised £4 million from ap rivate-equity firm,b egan importing fully automatic self-service espresso machines from Seattle, and by 2007 was operating them in over 600 locations before selling the firm for £23 million in 2008. 61 What is striking here is the transfer of consumer acceptance of the notion of Italianstyle coffee as aquality productcapable of justifying aprice premium from the speciality coffee shop all the way to the petrol station. Coffee Nation was subsequently acquired by Costa who began operating it under the brand name Costa Express in 2011. 62 In March 2013 the price difference betweenabarista-prepared Costa cappuccino and the selfservice version available in the filling station was just 15 pence (£2.15 v. £2.00). 63 The acquisition fitted into astrategy of transitioning Costa from beingacoffee-shop company into ac offee brand whoseo fferings were available across all sectors:C osta now retails ground coffee in supermarkets and sells discs for use in Kraft's Tassimo system that promiseto' bring you the greattaste of Costa at home'. 64 While Costa has ridden the path by which Italian-style coffee has been transformed from ap remium to am ainstream coffee offering, thoseo perators who attempted to mobilise resistancetot his were forced to back down.McDonald's regularly mocked the new-stylec offee culturei nt heir British advertising( running ac ampaign in the London Underground in 2005, for instance, promoting their 'freshlyground coffee without the ladi-dah'), but started serving cappuccinos and lattes in 2007 and by 2010 were outselling Costa to become the largest single seller of coffee outside the home in the UK. 65 The 'Espresso Revolution' in continental Europe
Although the UK still possesses over 40% of the total number of branded coffee outlets within Europe,t he sector experienced year on year double-digitg rowth across the continent since2000, peaking at 13% in 2008. Despitethe financial meltdownofthat year, it continues to expand rapidlywith 6.8% growth recorded in 2011. 66 This sectionanalyses the spread of espresso consumption throughout Europe, the business formatsand cultural reference pointsthat supportedthis expansion, as well as the connections and comparisons betweenthis experience and that of the UK.
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Thefirst modern-style coffee chaininGermany was founded by Vanessa Kullman,a young fashion designer from Hamburg, who in as tory not dissimilar from that of Sahar Hashemi, returnedfrom aspellinNew York to set up Balzac Coffeeinher home city in 1998. Coffee was now drunk from glasses -e .g. caffè latte, half coffee and half milk -a nd prepared with fully automatic coffee machines according to the Swiss tradition. At the end of the 1990s, espresso in all its variants then reached the new, young coffee drinkers. The 'espresso monopoly' of Italian restaurants, trattorias and osterias was now broken in Germany. Espresso, cappuccino and latte macchiato are words now on everyone's lips -a nd the milk industry is booming [ ... ].
[S]yrups and extracts became socially acceptable [ ... ]. It was soon recognised that there is no natural law which prescribes that only bad coffee can be drunk from ac ardboard cup. 69 There are several interesting features in thisa ccount. It highlights the same process of removing and repositioning Italian style coffee away from the milieu of the 'cheap' ethnically marked Italian enterprises that took place in the UK. Similar, too, was the repositioning and presentation of Italian coffee as al ifestyle productw ithin which both drink-in and take-away culturecould be presented as 'cool'. Most notable was the author's apparent lackofany sense of contradiction about amalgamating the American coffee shop format, Italian-style coffee beverages, and the useofSwiss coffee machines into ageneric statementt hat 'Italian coffee culturec onquered the German market.' 70 Producers presented these elements as unproblematic pieces and combinedthem to promotecoffee as apremium product, which consumersw ere prepared to pay the price to acquire.
In Germany too, Italian-style coffee has becomeamainstream coffee beverage outside the home. Currently the runaway market leader in the branded coffee-shop sectori s McCafé -acoffee-shop unit usually located in the same propertyasthe McDonald'sfastfood franchise, but physically separated from it. This format originated in Australia and is operatedbycountry franchise holders in Europe. The first McCafé opened in Cologne in 2003; in October 2011 there were 762 of these outlets in operation. 71 McCafé is now the leading operator by unit number in seven of the 14 countries in which it is trading.
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Its success is particularlymarked amongst two very different age groups -y oung adults and the over 50s, ac lientele the company were particularlyk een to attract, as they stopped going to the restaurant once their children had left home. 73 Espresso sales account for nearly 50% of the German out-of-home market, yet in 2010 only 7.6% of that market was composed of coffee shops. Thelargest sector in the German out-of-home market is the bakerysector, into which coffee has crossed with manyoutlets now combining ac offee and seating offer, alongside their baked goods. 74 Thel eading machines uppliers to thiss ector are the Swiss manufacturers of fully automatic bean-tocup machines that avoidt he need for trained baristas. Franke,f or example, launched its first machinew ith am icroprocessor and an integratedm ilk steamer in 1994 and significantly refined it in 1996 so it could produceaf reshly brewed and foamed cappuccino. 75 Franke machines are used in McCafé as well as in Caffè Dalluci, Germany's 13 893 EuropeanR eview of History-Revue europé enne d'histoire secondl argest speciality coffee chain, which labels itself 'a modern Italian-style coffee shop with aw ide selection of specialityc offees'b ut is operatedb yt he food-service multinational the Compass Group. Starbucks famously shifted to machines made by the Swiss manufacturer Thermoplan after 1999. This is am arket in which Italy has missedout: while 70% of the professionalcoffee machines manufactured in Italy between2004 and 2008 were exported, fewer than 14% of these were super-automatics. 76 Many chains positioning themselves as Italian use 'traditional' coffee machines operatedb yt rained baristas as aw ay of distinguishing themselves within the market. According to Paul Ettinger, Caffè Nero has never contemplated switching to bean-to-cup: 'Not ever,it's very muchpart of the brand [ ... ]. I can't imagine we would ever change [ ... ]; it's against everything we believe in.' 77 In Scandinaviacoffee shops serving espresso-based beverages first appeared at much the same time on the European continent as they did in the UK. Again thesew ere often foundedb yl ocal entrepreneurs who were initially inspired by their experience of the format in America. In Norway the first two coffee shops appeared in Oslo in 1994, both set up by studentsupon their return from the United States. These introduced a'new invention for the Norwegians: espressos, cappuccinos and lattes [ ...]t he whole Italian/American menu'. 78 The beverages contrasted sharply with the preference for black, drip-brewed coffee served in ademi-tasse, which was common across the Nordic nations that are the highest per capita consumerso fc offee by weight in the world. As coffee shops spread throughout the region, so ad istinction developed not just betweend rinking filter and espresso in and out of the home respectively, but also,p articularlya mong women, of consuming the milk-based beverages within the coffee shop. 79 Coffee-shop chains remain relatively small-scale and have been careful to position themselves as part of an artisan-style speciality coffee movement. Kaffebrenneriet,one of the two original Oslo operations, and now the leading Norwegian chain with 23 outlets in October2 011, serves high-quality single-origin coffee, and sells both beans and coffee equipment for use at home. Most chains across the Nordic region are not only locally owned, butalso presented as such. Baresso, the leading Danish chain established in 1999, clearly references Italy, where its founderworked for many years, through its name; but it is only Wayne's Coffee, aSwedish-owned chain, that consciously seeks to brand itself as American, benefitting, as analystsh ave suggested, from ag reater openness to America amongst younger Swedes. 80 Starbucks meanwhile remains ar elatively insignificant presence in Scandinavia.
In thoseregions which had first adopted espresso in the 1950s, adifferent dynamic can be observed, as appreciation for the Italian, and Italian-style beverages, has grown at the expenseofthe localvariants. In Switzerland the latte macchiato is rapidly catching up with café crè me in terms of preference outside the home.
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In Austria, Schä rf, the local machine manufacturers and roasters, launched the CoffeeS hopC ompany, af ranchise concept in 1999, serving Italian-style coffees in units 'combining the original American concept of branded coffee shops with the premium ambiance of at raditional Viennese café '-the latter element supplied by expanding the menu and service offer. 82 McCafé in Austria went one stepfurther by positioning itselfasincarnating 'the new world of coffee',astrap line employed in itst elevision advertising which contrasted its modern Italian-style beverages with those of yesteryear, depictedi nablack and white 'silent-movie' style setting. 83 Elsewhere chains were held back by the crowded and fragmented nature of the HORECA sector. In France, locale ntrepreneurs established branded concepts such as Columbus Coffeeasearly as 1996, while Starbucks arrived in 2004, but despite increasing J. Morris 
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enthusiasm for Italian-style beverages (not least among the large players in the bakery sector), growth rates remained slow. 84 McCafé has rapidly becomethe sector leader since opening its first outlet in 2007, helped by its ability to open shops within the desirable locations already occupied by the restaurants. In Italy, too, McCafé can be presented as the largest coffee chain, counting 127 outletsi n2 011, compared to the 61 units of Espressamente Illy operated under franchise. Structural, as mucha sc ultural, factors, explain why, with only seven branded coffee outletsp er million inhabitants, Italy and Francer epresent very different markets from Germany with 23 outletso rA ustria at 36, let alone the UK with 78. 85 Thes pread of the branded coffee chain has been interpreted as evidence of the 'McDonaldisation' of European society. This is acharge that sociologist George Ritzerthe originator of the term -h as himselfl evelled at Starbucks'o perations in the US, arguing that the experience at Starbucks is efficient, predictable, calculable and controlled by non-human technology. 86 ArguablyMcCafé and all those outletsutilising bean-to-cup coffee machines can be categorised as fitting into this model.
An umber of features of the 'coffee revolution', however, contradict the notion of a straightforward Americanisation. With the exception of Starbucks,n one of the major operatorsisAmerican, and Starbucks, as we have seen, was alater arrival, capitalising on the groundwork that had already been done in its transatlantic shadow by local entrepreneurs adapting the coffee-shop format. Sixty-six out of the 70 leading chains operating across the European and Middle East region in 2011 were European in origin. The largest, in terms of absolute number of outlets was Costa, with the top 10 madeupof two Britishc hains, two Russian, and one each from Germany, Italy, Greece and the Netherlands, alongside the US (Starbucks) and Australia (McCafé ). 87 Thebroadest distribution in terms of country coverage was that of Segafredo Zanetti, which opened its first outlet in Paris in 1988 and is now present in 37 states. Like other Italian operatorsituses franchising and licensed concepts to leverageits nationalheritage, even thoughitroasts mostofits coffee outside Italy. 88 The reluctance of Italian companies to operate their own coffee-shop chains reflects the weaknesso ft he domestic market discussede arlier.
In the creation of symbolic value aroundItalian-style coffee, producers have happily blended awide varietyofcultural reference points and practices, as the spread of espressobased beverages in post-Soviet Europe illustrates. The Britishownedchain, Coffeeheaven, opened in Polandin2000, and by 2008 had added outlets in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. Its publicity materials claimed its coffeehouses 'feel as familiar and relaxed as acafé in London, Paris or Rome [ ... ].
[T]he Coffeeheaven concept combinest he best of two converging worlds: Western experience with "new" Europe's aspirations, talent and youth.' 89 The Russian chain Shokoladnica, foundedi n 2001 and now the seventh largest in Europe, serves 'traditional' chocolates pecialities alongside ac ontemporary coffee-shop beverage menu. 90 As consumption of Italian-style coffee becamem ainstream,aso-called 'third wave' artisanal cultureevolved beyond this. This originatedwith the foundation of the Speciality CoffeeAssociation of Europe in 1998, which instituted the WorldBarista Championships, jointly organised with the Speciality CoffeeA ssociation of America. Winners of these events have often gone on to set up speciality café sorroasteriesintheir own right, and are frequently used to endorse high-end machines by manufacturers, who also compete to have their machineadopted for official use in the contest.
This createdanewcareerstructure forthose workingwithinthe coffee industry,and led to thee stablishment of transnationaln etworks, linked by social media, that supportedt he 15 895 EuropeanR eview of History-Revue europé enne d'histoire emergenceo fn ew,u pmarket, enterprises. BonanzaC offee, a' third-wave'r oaster café opened in Berlin in 2007 wasdescribed by itsfounder as having been createdfrom'open source'i nformation from then et. 91 TheC offeemania chaini nM oscow, whichs erves seasonal coffee usingavarietyo fh igh-endt echniques, wasf ounded by twoy oung entrepreneursi n2 001, immediatelyj oined theS CAE, first enteredabaristai ntot he 2003 WBC, andnow sendsits baristas on exchange to Brazil,Londonand Australia. 92 In London thereare over 150artisanal coffee shops, many supplied by the2007WBC champion James Hoffman, of Square Mile Coffee roasters.Ofthese,atleast athird arereckonedtoberun by é migré sf romA ustralia andN ew Zealand. 93 As Italian-stylec offeeo ffersb ecome mainstream within Europe,itisthese artisanproviders whoare presenting newbeverageand brewingstylesthatmay againchanget he cultural meanings around coffee.
Conclusion: coffee and the production of culture This article has traced how coffee in Europe has been transformed from ab everage that was presented as essentially an everyday product with relatively little symbolic value, into one whose perceived valuewas such that it could supportapremium price which, in turn, allowed it to be presented in such aw ay as to justify this. Italian-style coffees, around which this transformation was built, have become so popular within many European coffee cultures that they are not only influencing the out-of-home,b ut also the at-home sector, where Nespresso capsules have achieved annual growth rates of over 30% p.a. since 2000, by presenting themselvesasd eliveringapremium espresso experience. 94 Analysing the 'espresso revolution' from the production of culturep erspective, the article has demonstrated how changesininterrelated facets have cumulated and facilitated the shift from nationalc offee cultures to Italian-style espresso withinafew years after 1995. Technology was fundamental to advances in espresso production, but thiswas not, in itself, sufficient to produce an immediate impact upon consumption habits (the 'genius' innovation). It was not Gaggia's machines, but the cheaper semi-automatics of the 1960s that drove the expansion of espresso culturei nI taly. The bean-to-cup machines of the 1990s were more important in the mainstreaming of Italian-style coffee, rather than establishing its initial premium position. Even in the case of Nespresso, the system had been launched in 1986, but was initially targeted at the office and restaurant sectors,only later becoming abeneficiary of the coffee revolution.
Regulation contributed significantly to the production of coffee culture, whether in terms of its shaping of the structures of the Italian bar market, or through the impacts of measures such as no-smoking legislation leading to an expansion of the provision of Italian-style coffee: for that matter the expansion of the EU created unexpected consequences by making available al abour force of foreign baristas within the UK.
The' espresso revolution' is principally as tory about the structureso ft he coffee industrya nd the ways that new entrants came into the industry with very different perceptions of the market. The industry structures that developed over the first half of the twentieth century were such that power became concentrated among the giantr oasters within the 'at-home' sector, who transformed coffee into an everyday product for preparing coffee according to aprevalent 'national' style. In the HORECA sector, amuch weaker set of operators were bound togetherinstructuresthat stifled innovation, not least because of the prevailinglow margins within the service industry.
Local entrepreneurs from outside the industry (both individual and corporate) were able to move into amarket that they perceived existedinEurope,partly based on what had already happened in the US, partly on the increased interest in food and drink products in general, andI talian onesi np articular, effectively investingt hese with symbolic capital. As start-up businesses, unconstrainedby organisational structures or career hierarchies, their founders were free to follow their instincts,providing they couldaccess thenecessary funding. Manycamefrombackgrounds in thefinancialindustry whichhelpedthemtodojustthat.
Thee xisting industry conceivedo ft he market for coffee as ah omogenous one in which competition between providerswouldessentially be based on price. In contrast, the new operators understood the market as asegmented one in which certaingroups would respond to offers based around service, quality and the symbolic values embodied by Italian-style coffee. European entrepreneurs proveda dept at presenting thesew ithin formats that playfully blended and subverted nationalr eference points as props that justified premium pricing. The cumulative effect of these interventions was that coffeedrinkinga cquired expressive power as ademonstrationo fcultural capital.
In hiss eminals et of observations on the 'psychosociology'o ff ood consumption, Roland Barthes suggestedt hat in societies where basic nutritional needs are easily met 'food has ac onstant tendency to transform itselfi nto situation': that is, its meaning is determined by the contextsinwhich it is consumed. Writing in 1950s Franceheclaimed that there was no better illustration of this than coffee, which had once been considered a stimulant that facilitated work, but had come to be associated with momentso fr est and relaxation: ashift that had been madepossiblebecause 'coffee is felt to be not so mucha substancea sacircumstance.' 95 Yet, as this articlehas shown, therelationship between'substance' and'circumstance'is more complexthanBarthes'formulation allows.Inorder forthe 'circumstances'surrounding coffee to change,the coffee hadtochangetoo.Whencoffeebecameamass consumer good during themid-twentieth century, divergent'quasi-national'coffeestylesdeveloped across Europe.InFrance, forexample,the adoption of thecafetiè re as thepreferred form of brewing apparatuscoincidedwiththe cultural shiftthatBarthes detected.
Thes uccess of the coffee shop and the spread of Italian-style coffee throughout the continent at the end of the twentieth century can similarly only be understood in relation to each other. The contrast betweend rinkingc offee prepared according to the collective 'national style' at home or in the workplace, and consuming Italian-style coffee beverages within the setting of the coffee shop, endowed the latter act with sufficient expressive potential that it couldb eu sed by consumersi nt he production of self. This is the underlying answer to the question 'Why Espresso?'
